A Rising Turkic Bloc?

By Julian Fischer-Lhamon

The Turkic peoples have long been separated politically as well as geographically by Russia, Persia, and the Caspian Sea. In spite of, or rather because of, this separation, a great sense of Turkic identity has spread and survived over the centuries between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. Although Turkish nationalists have dreamed of a singular pan-Turkic polity, this ambition died with the collapse of the Wehrmacht’s 6th Army at Stalingrad. During the Cold War, Turkey was long separated from the rest of the Turkic world which was dominated by the USSR. With its collapse, Turkey strove to establish cordial relations with Central Asia, leading to the development of economic and political ties, such as the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency, along with the strengthening of pre-existing linguistic and cultural ties, as demonstrated by the International Organization of Turkic Culture or the Nomad Games, a type “Turkic Olympics”. More significantly, trade between Turkey and Central Asia has doubled in the last ten years to $12.6 billion and the Organisation of Turkic States has become an active regional organization. 

Central Asia has started developing a unique position in Eurasian geopolitics. However, it will be difficult for these countries to leverage their position on their own due to the small population size of the region of just 76 million and a nominal GDP of nearly $500 billion. What could hold a key area to compensate for this reality is this the addition of Turkey and Azerbaijan to this bloc. These action would increase the numbers to around 170 million people and nominal GDP of $2.3 trillion. In theory this bloc would be able to resist pressure and unwanted influence.

This Central Asian “hedge” aligns neatly with Turkey’s own foreign policy which sees it vacillate between East and West. Recently, Ankara has again leaned back towards a more receptive Washington as the two haggle over access to the F-35 program and Turkish-owned S-400 air defense systems. From a realist perspective, there is great incentive for the Turkic powers to coordinate more closely together in the future as their foreign policy goal of “balancing” align. 

Since Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, there has been a surge of interest and investment in the “Middle Corridor”, a rail-sea connection between Europe and China through Central Asia. In the last eight months traffic along the corridor has increased 20-fold, new rail line are being built in Georgia, and China has created a “dry port” in Xi’an which forms 30% of all container trains to Europe through Kazakhstan. The full potential of this route has not been reached. It currently takes 60 days to navigate through the corridor, but estimates show this can be reduced to just 13 days with a $20 billion investment. These developments could foster much stronger economic and political ties which could eventually lead to a more potent regional organization. 

Greater Turkish-Central Asian cooperation has the potential to alter the balance of power within Eurasia and greatly increase its prosperity. Thus, all powers should strive to keep this bloc neutral in order to prevent any conflict that could arise out of any reactions. For example, any signs of NATO expansion via Turkey will be a great security concern for Russia, China, and Iran. A wise West, will instead help this rising bloc play off against all three of America’s rivals.