Uruguay and China Strengthen Ties Amid Washington’s “Donroe Doctrine”

In January 2026, Uruguayan President Yamandú Orsi embarked on one of Montevideo’s most ambitious diplomatic missions in decades. Orsi led a delegation of 150 to the Chinese cities of Beijing and Shanghai with aims of expanding trade, investment, and political cooperation between the two states. This mission mixes high‑level global diplomacy with market-oriented business outreach, with Orsi describing it as a strategy to “empower Uruguay in the world.” Despite the apparent positive progress in Sino-Uruguayan relations, the small South American state may be caught in the globalized United States-China rivalry, which is unfolding particularly consequentially in Latin America. These strengthening of ties between Beijing and Montevideo is a test of not only longstanding American hegemony desires in the region, but of President Donald Trump’s revamped interest in the Western Hemisphere under what some have called his administration “Donroe Doctrine.”
The size of the delegation is telling of the importance of this meeting to not just the Uruguayan government, but the state’s commercial sector as well. More than 100 of the delegation’s members were from the private sector, according to Foreign Minister Mario Lubetkin, displaying Uruguay’s intentions to deepen its economic ties to China. Beyond economic motivations, this mission was wide-reaching in nature as well. The February 3 meeting between Orsi and Chinese President Xi Jinping marked the 38th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two states. The result of this was the signing of 12 cooperation agreements between Beijing and Montevideo focused on a wide range of areas such as agriculture, environmental policy, science, technology, fisheries, and education, among others. This is regionally relevant as Uruguay is a founding member of the South American trade bloc Mercosur, perhaps signaling eventual increased China-Mercosur cooperation. Additionally, in this meeting, President Xi stressed the importance of the partnership in an “equal and orderly multipolar world,” a common theme among relations between his state and the states of the Global South. This appears to be a challenge to the American pursuit of unilateral dominance in Latin America.
In a region where many governments, such as Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia, among others, are shifting to the ideological right, Uruguay’s center-left Broad Front party remains the majority. Therefore, a shift away towards Beijing, and consequently away from Washington, is not a shock. Despite this, it appears that this strengthening of ties is not a move of ideological motives, but rather of pragmatism. There is economic logic in this tightening partnership. China is the largest trading partner of Uruguay, an export reliant state that sends 27% of its exports eastward to China. The primary commodities being sent eastward are agricultural products such as beef, soybeans, and wood pulp. From China, Uruguay receives manufactured goods such as electronics and machinery, in addition to chemicals. This economic model is essential in securing foreign currency earnings, importing much needed goods, and sustaining Uruguay’s vast agricultural regions outside of the capital, Montevideo. In just Q1 and Q2 of 2025, Uruguay had a $187.1 million trade surplus with China, showing the positive benefits of this bilateral relationship in Uruguay. Paired with a strong Uruguayan peso against a locally weakening U.S. dollar, expanded Uruguayan access to foreign markets like China is vital for the Latin American state’s economy.
Beyond economic opportunities, this diplomatic mission has a robust technological and educational component. It was announced that Uruguay’s University of the Republic, the state’s flagship public university, plans to increase its ties to China as well. This includes agreements to collaborate with Chinese universities in a variety of formats, a technology deal with Chinese firm awei, and joint research on water resources and hydropower. With the potential weight of Beijing behind it, this could make Uruguay a regional hub for innovation in the education and technology sectors.
Aside from trade and widespread collaboration, this diplomatic meeting has had important geopolitical consequences. A joint statement from the partners proclaimed the island of Taiwan as “inalienable” territory of China. In response, Taiwan asserted its sovereignty and independence, warning Uruguay against embracing Beijing’s “One China” policy due to the potential implications on East Asian regional stability. Taiwan, however, is not the only critic of this bold Montevideo stance, with domestic opposition claiming such a stance undermines the typically pragmatic and stable Uruguayan foreign policy. Altogether, although this stance may alienate other partners, it is certainly a sign of tightening Sino-Uruguayan cooperation efforts.
The overarching actor in Latin America, however, has long been, and continues to be, the United States. Washington sees the entire Western Hemisphere as its sphere of influence, with the Trump administration taking a renewed interest in the region. It has struck Venezuela, sent economic relief to Argentina, and butted heads with Brazil. This is part of what observers have called the “Donroe Doctrine,” President Trump’s 21st century version of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine that asserted the United States as the hegemonic power of its hemisphere. The primary motivation of these efforts appears to be countering China’s expanding presence in Latin America. Beijing has sought strong relations with countless Latin American states, especially in regard to trade, development, and technology. In an ideologically right-shifting region, which means likely choosing Washington over Beijing, Uruguay has defied both this trend and the “Donroe Doctrine.”
For Uruguay, this defiance is pragmatic; for China, this is a diplomatic win; and for the United States, it may be a sign that previously reliable democratic partners in its hemisphere may be recalibrating their foreign policies. Overall, Montevideo’s drift towards Beijing will likely have implications in both the hemisphere of the “Donroe Doctrine” and on the broader global geopolitical stage that is playing host to the United States-China rivalry.